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Intergenerational transfers in Spain: 

The role of education
 
Abstract
This paper shows the estimates of National Transfer Accounts (NTA) for Spain in 2006
disaggregated by education level. Overall, our results indicate that, besides age population
composition, education level has a big impact on the economic behavior of households and,
hence, on the aggregate economy. Educated households tend to participate more and
longer in the labor market, to produce more and, consequently, to consume more. As
differences in consumption are lower than in labor income, they are able to contribute to
the public system with higher taxes and contributions, and they depend less on public
transfers over their lifecycle. Therefore, education seems to be crucial to sustain the welfare
state in an ageing society.
Resumen
En este trabajo se presentan los resultados de las Cuentas Nacionales de Transferencias
(NTA) para España correspondientes al año 2006, desagregadas por nivel educativo.
Nuestros resultados indican que, además de la estructura de edades de la población, el nivel
educativo también tiene un importante impacto en el comportamiento económico de las
familias y por ende en el total de la economía. Los hogares con mayor nivel educativo
tienden a participar más y durante más tiempo en el mercado laboral, a producir más y, en
consecuencia, a consumir también más. Pero como las diferencias en el consumo son
menores que en renta, dichos hogares son capaces de pagar mayores impuestos y
contribuciones al sistema público, a la vez que son menos dependientes de las
transferencias públicas a lo largo de su ciclo vital. Así pues, la educación parece crucial para
contribuir a sostener el estado del bienestar ante el envejecimiento.
Key words: Ageing, Education, Intergenerational transfers, Public transfers, Welfare state. 
JEL codes: H53, I28, I38
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2 
1. Introduction
Individuals need to consume over their entire lifecycle in order to meet their needs, while in
general they can only generate resources during their working age. This implies that some
mechanisms are necessary in order to reallocate resources over the human lifecycle. These
reallocations can just imply an intertemporal distribution - for example, individuals can save 
during their working-age period to finance their old age. However, these mechanisms might
often involve an intergenerational transfer dimension, reallocating resources between
different generations. This is the case of family transfers: parents take care of their children
as their parents did, and maybe also take care of their elderly, in turn expecting their own
descendants to do the same.
What about public transfers? Over the 20th century, many countries have developed a set of
public expenditure programs devoted to covering the basic needs of their citizens, which
have come to be called the Welfare State (WS). Although important differences among
countries remain as regards the characteristics, size and coverage of WS programs, it can be
said that they are based on four pillars: education, health, pensions and other social
services. The WS is per se another mechanism (in addition to market and families) to
reallocate resources over the lifecycle of individuals, but mainly for interpersonal
distribution, as most WS programs are explicitly or implicitly organized on a pay-as-you-go
basis (transfers are financed by the taxes collected in the same period). Education is a clear
example of redistribution to the young, while pensions – and also health and long-term care
– are mostly directed toward the elderly.  
The role of intergenerational transfers in a society has been studied since the pioneering
work of Samuelson (1958), who introduced the overlapping generation models into
economic analysis. Numerous contributions have been made on this issue since then, but
the lack of data has limited the extent of empirical conclusions for a long time (Willis, 1988;
Lee et al. 1994; Auerbach et al. 1991; Albertini et al., 2008). In the early 2000s, an
international project called National Transfer Accounts (NTA) was launched in order to
construct a new international data set containing information about the reallocation of
resources between ages in each country. NTA disentangle the economic flows taking place
between age groups of population in a given year and a given country. The estimates
complement information provided by National Accounts, being consistent with them, and
allowing engaging analyses. By way of example, NTA data are extremely useful to study the
1
 
 
 
      
        
 
 
     
         
       
     
 
         
       
           
       
       
       
      
          
         
           
        
         
     
 
 
 
 
 
          
           
       
        
          
         
       
3 Abío et al.: Intergenerational Transfers in Spain: The Role of Education 
economic effects of ageing (in both the public and the private transfer system). Also, they
can be used to test the existence and length of the so-called demographic dividend (the
effects of demographics on economic growth).
The basic NTA approach only takes into account age groups of individuals, without
incorporating any kind of population heterogeneity. Some extensions of NTA have
subsequently been derived, including some kind of heterogeneity, hence improving the
explanatory power of these estimates. Among others, it is worth mentioning the estimation
of NTA profiles disaggregated by gender, especially if data on time use are also incorporated. 
In this way, NTA provide information by age and sex on resource reallocations not only
regarding market activities but also for non-market ones, such as housework and care (see
Donehower and Mejía-Guevara, 2012; Hammer et al. 2015; Zannella, 2015; Renteria et al.
2016). Another interesting extension of NTA would be to disaggregate NTA profiles by
socioeconomic status, using some indicator like household income level. For example, Turra
et al. (2011) used NTA profiles differentiated by income groups to analyze the incidence of
public transfers in Brazil and Chile. Miller et al. (2014), Mejía-Guevara (2015) and Hammer
(2016) construct NTA by education level for Chile, Mexico and Austria, respectively. This is
the extension we also develop in this paper, in this case applied to Spain, estimating the NTA
disaggregated by education level of household head, in order to identify the differences in
behavior patterns over the lifecycle. The rest of the paper is organized as follows. Section 2
summarizes NTA methodology. In Section 3, we explain the data and estimation process.
Section 4 presents the results and discusses the main findings. Finally, Section 5 contains the
conclusion.
2. An overview of National Transfer Accounts
The international project to construct NTA was launched in the early 2000s. It initially
involved seven countries, which nowadays are more than 40 from all over the world
(including Spain). First NTA results for a selected group of countries were published by Lee
and Mason (2011). NTA roots are in the broad literature on intergenerational transfers,
involving both economic and demographic aspects. This highlights the fact that a system to
transfer resources across ages is needed, as individuals only produce during a limited period
of their lives, while they consume throughout their lifecycle. NTA disentangle how resources
2
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4 
move between the different age groups in an economy in a given year. Hence, NTA provide
complementary information to National Accounts (NA) of each country, being consistent
with them. Moreover, NTA estimates are also internationally comparable, because they are
constructed following a common methodology (UN, 2013). The starting point of the NTA
method is the following transformation of the NA identity:
𝑌𝐿 + 𝑌𝐴 + 𝑇𝐺+ + 𝑇𝐹+ = 𝐶 + 𝑆 + 𝑇𝐺, + 𝑇𝐹, [1]
Where YL is labor income, YA asset income, C consumption, S savings and TG and TF
represent public and private transfers, respectively, being positive when they are received
by individuals (inflows, +) or negative when they are paid by individuals (outflows, -). 
Equation [1] summarizes the resources constraint for the whole economy in a given period
(time subscripts are omitted for simplicity), but also for each individual of each particular
age. The different sources of revenues on the left-hand side (labor income, asset income and
public and private transfers received) finance expenses collected on the right-hand side 
(consumption, savings, transfers to public sector – through taxes and social contributions –
and to other private individuals). Rearranging Equation [1], we obtain:
𝐶 , 𝑌𝐿 = (𝑌𝐴 , 𝑆) + (𝑇𝐹+ , 𝑇𝐹,) + (𝑇𝐺+ , 𝑇𝐺,) [2]
The difference between consumption and labor income on the left-hand side of equation [2]
is the so-called lifecycle deficit (LCD), which is typically positive at the beginning and the end
of the lifecycle (childhood and old age) and negative in the middle (working life). The LCD
should be financed through the three possible mechanisms expressed on the right-hand
side. First, through asset-based reallocations (ABR), that is to say individuals can allocate
their asset income, save and dissave to transfer their income intertemporally. Second,
through private transfers typically made on an intra-household basis, but that could also
occur between households (inter-household transfers). Finally, age reallocations can also
take place through transfers made by the public sector, like education, health, pensions and
unemployment programs, among others. The role of each of these three mechanisms varies
across countries – in particular, public transfers are more important in countries with
consolidated welfare states - but also by age groups within the same country. This is one of
the interesting features that NTA data make it possible to analyze, as it provides age profiles
of resource reallocations. Figure 1 shows the amount of public (TG) and private (TF) transfers
3
 
 
 
           
         
         
       
     
    
          
     
       
       
   
 
  
 
       
   
   
          
        
    
         
          
           
             
    
    
     
      
          
    
 
          
    
      
5 Abío et al.: Intergenerational Transfers in Spain: The Role of Education 
received by children (ages 0-19) and the elderly (ages 65 and over) in different countries
with NTA data available. Data are expressed as a percentage of average labor income for
ages 30-49 in the same country in order to make them comparable. As can be observed,
public transfers are more important in European countries, and also in the USA, Brazil and
Japan, while private transfers play the main role in age resource reallocations in other Asian
and Latin American countries. Clearly, public transfers are mainly directed toward the elderly
in almost all countries. For example, in Sweden a person aged 65 or over receives in public
transfers an average of 110% the average labor income for ages 30-49 in the country, while a
young under 20 year old receives only 32%. In the case of Spain, public transfers are lower,
but again clearly unbalanced in favor of the elderly, who receive almost 50% of average
labor income for ages 30-49, while children receive barely 17%.
[Figure 1 about here]
To summarize, NTA provide rich information about resource allocation between ages which
was not previously available. Nevertheless, many factors apart from age influence the
specific economic behavior of individuals. This is the case of socioeconomic status, which has
given rise to an extension of NTA methodology in order to obtain estimations of age profiles
disaggregated by this characteristic. Some recent works show that economic profiles by age
are significantly different when including some indicator of individual socioeconomic status.
Turra et al. (2011) estimated public transfers by income quartiles for Brazil and Chile. More
recently, Miller et al. (2014) and Mejía-Guevara (2015) provided NTA estimations
disaggregated by education level of household head for Chile and Mexico, respectively. They
show that the high inequality indicators in these countries give rise to a very different
resource allocation for individuals of different socioeconomic status. For example, Miller et
al. (2014) estimate that children in households whose head has not completed secondary
school receive barely half the educational investment of households with tertiary education.
In Europe, Hammer (2015) has estimated complete NTA by individual education level in
Austria, showing considerable differences in most profiles, such as labor income, taxes or
public transfers received, among others.
In this paper, we construct NTA for Spain disaggregated by education level of household
head. Education attainment and income level of individuals (or households) are clearly
linked. Figure 2 shows the distribution of Spanish households observed in the European
4
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6 
Survey on Income and Living Conditions (EU-SILC) according to the level of education of the
household head and the total income of the household – aggregated monetary income
obtained by all household members. As observed, there is a clear relation between level of
studies and total income. In the highest total income deciles, two thirds of households have
a head with post-secondary education, while only 9% have primary studies. The picture is
exactly the opposite for the households in the lowest income deciles.
[Figure 2 about here]
Our focus will be on education attainment instead of income distribution, given that
education can be considered a more stable and better predictor of the permanent income of
the household than the income observed in a particular year. In this way, our results
complement others previously obtained in literature on inequality. For example Cantó
(2013), using data from EUROMOD, analyzes the distributive effects of taxes and in-cash
transfers on disposable income of families in Spain between 2005 and 2011. Calero and Gil
(2013) focus on the distributive effects of public education and health policies. 
3. Constructing NTA profiles by level of education in Spain
Different micro data sets are used in each country to estimate NTA. Age profiles are
constructed first in per capita terms. Afterwards, each aggregate profile is obtained by
multiplying the per capita age profile by the population age distribution. Aggregate profiles
are then adjusted to the corresponding aggregate values provided by National Accounts, in
order to make both data sources consistent. The estimation process of age profiles is 
complex and usually conditioned by data availability (see UN, 2013 for specific details). This
complexity justifies the fact that most countries have estimations for only a few years. This
Section is devoted to describing the data and estimation procedure of NTA in Spain,
disaggregated by level of education referring to 2006.
The level of education in this study is a measure used to distribute households among
socioeconomic groups. As explained above, educational attainment is a more stable
indicator of the household’s socioeconomic status in the long term, not affected by
variations in the annual income. Besides labor income and other individual social transfers,
the rest of the variables are obtained at the household level such as, for example,
5
 
 
 
        
      
         
     
      
         
     
  
 
           
  
 
 
           
        
       
 
       
         
       
          
        
         
     
    
    
 
      
        
            
  
      
        
7 Abío et al.: Intergenerational Transfers in Spain: The Role of Education 
consumption, implying that household features may be more important than individual 
characteristics, especially for children. For this reason, we measure education attainment at
the household and not at individual level. In particular, we assign households according to
education level of household head, defined in the NTA as the person with the highest
income in the household. The education level or education attainment is measured in the
surveys as a categorical indicator that we finally grouped in three categories: compulsory,
complete secondary and post-secondary. Based on these assumptions, NTA profiles were
constructed separately for households belonging to each education category.
The basic NTA equation Eq. [2] needs to be balanced for each age group (x) and education
level (s):
𝐶 , 𝑌𝐿 = 𝑌𝐴 , 𝑆
 
+    𝑥,𝑠 𝑥,𝑠 ( 𝑥,𝑠 𝑥,𝑠) (𝑇𝐹
+ ,
,𝑠 , 𝑇𝐹 𝑥,𝑠) + (𝑇𝐺
+
𝑥 𝑥,𝑠 , 𝑇𝐺
, 
𝑥,𝑠)                           [3] 
To do that, we construct profiles of each variable by education level of the household (when
data are available), and then we adjust the sum of the aggregate amount of each specific
group to match the total – for all education groups – profile by age.
When considering total population, net public transfers must equal zero, as well as net
private intra-household transfers. This is because in NTA by construction all transfer inflows
should be reallocated as transfer outflows. In the case of public transfers, this implies that
each expenditure program is covered by general taxes or by an earmarked tax when there is
one – like social contributions for contributory pensions. When flows received by the
government do not equal payments made to the government, the excess or deficit is
considered as public asset-based reallocations. When profiles are divided into educational
groups, the same procedure applies, although net transfers equal zero only at the aggregate
level but not necessarily for each education group.
We rely on different databases to construct economic age profiles for each variable. We use 
the Household Budget Survey (EPF) to estimate private consumption profiles, and the
European Survey on Income and Living Conditions (EU-SILC) to construct income profiles.
Regarding the age profiles of private transfers, they are estimated combining both databases
mentioned above. Finally, public consumption, pensions and other social expenditure data
are extracted from different statistics published by the government (Ministries of
6
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8 
Employment and Social Security – MEYSS –; Education – MECD – and Health and Social
Services – MSSSI) and the NHS (National Health Survey) produced by INE (National Statistics
Institute). National economic aggregates, used to adjust the resulting profiles, come from
Spanish National Accounts (INE). All databases used refer to 2006, chosen as our base year in
order to avoid any effect of the economic cycle on the transfer profiles.
Disaggregation by education level is only available for those data extracted from individual
surveys (EPF, EU-SILC) and for the NHS. This means that, unfortunately, it is not possible to
obtain all the profiles disaggregated by education level. This is the case of public
consumption (education, public hospitalization and other public consumption) and some
public cash transfers that are not very well specified in the EU-SILC survey, such as
survivorship pensions. On the other hand, it is worth mentioning that education
classification in the two main surveys (EPF and EU- SILC) used to construct the profiles differs
slightly, which finally forced us to group education attainment in only three categories:
primary, secondary and post-secondary. The difficulties in combining both classifications
come basically from the legal changes introduced in the Spanish educational system by the
LOGSE from 1990 onwards.1 Until the LOGSE, only primary education (until age 14) was
compulsory, while after its approval the first stage of secondary education (ages 14-16) also
became compulsory. In the EPF survey, the compulsory education category includes all the
former students that only finished primary education, but also those who completed the
first stage of secondary education after the LOGSE. However, the EU-SILC does not contain a 
category for compulsory education, but rather one for general secondary education, mixing
the first stage of secondary education (currently in the compulsory stage) with a secondary
level existing in the past, more equivalent to the current second stage of secondary
education. Regarding higher education, EU-SILC considers all degrees that require a second
stage of secondary education for admission, which is a broader definition of post-secondary
education than the one in EPF (‘university degrees or equivalent education’)/ Table 1 shows
the category matching we performed between the classifications from both surveys. 
[Table 1 about here]
Figure 3 compares the population distribution by age and education level resulting from
both surveys (EU-SILC and EPF). Some differences are observed between the two
1 LOGSE, Ley Orgánica General del Sistema Educativo (General Organic Law on the Education System).
7
 
 
 
      
        
     
 
    
 
   
 
   
        
   
      
          
          
         
         
         
       
          
           
   
 
 
           
    
      
 
     
 
                                                        
             
 
9 Abío et al.: Intergenerational Transfers in Spain: The Role of Education 
distributions, specially concentrated in the younger generations (ages 10-30) with the lowest
level of education. We used the distribution observed in the EU-SILC, as it is closer to the
one observed in the population censuses available for 2011.2 
[Figure 3 about here]
Below we give more details about the construction of the different NTA profiles.
Lifecycle deficit (LCD)
As stated in Eqs. [2] and [3], LCD is the difference between consumption (private and public)
and labor income at each age and for each education level. Private consumption is estimated
separately for education, health and ‘other consumption’ (including housing consumption)
using data from EPF survey. Education consumption for each age group is obtained by
performing a regression of total education consumption in the household among the
number of people aged less than 29 enrolled at school at each age. The estimated
coefficients are then applied to the distribution of education consumption among the
members of the household. Regarding health consumption, it is distributed among
household members using coefficients of utilization of each item (hospitalization, outpatient
care and pharmacy) obtained from available data on hospital stays (Conjunto Mínimo Básico
de Datos – CMBD) and the NHS. Finally, the rest of consumption is distributed by age using
the following equivalent scale proposed by the NTA method (see UN, 2013):
𝑥  
20
(
 
,𝑥
𝛼 ) = 1 , 0.6 ∗ 𝐷(4 < 𝑥 < 20) ∗ , 0.6 ∗ 𝐷(𝑥 ≤ 4)  [4] 
16 
Where x refers to the age of the individual and D is a dummy variable equal to 1 when the
condition inside the parenthesis is met, and zero otherwise. This equivalent scale allows the
allocation of total other expenditure of household j to each household member i as follows:
𝐶𝐻𝐻௜௝(𝑥) = 𝐶𝐻𝐻௝/ ∑ 𝛼(𝑥)𝑀௝(𝑥) [5]𝑥 
2 We also estimated the NTA profiles using the EPF population distribution instead of the EU -SILC,
obtaining very similar results.
8
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10 
Where 𝐶𝐻𝐻௜௝ is the amount of other consumption by household member i in household j, 
𝐶𝐻𝐻௝ is total other consumption of household j, and 𝑀௝(𝑥) is the number of household
members of age x in household j.
Regarding the second component of LCD, labor income profiles by age and education level
are obtained from the data contained in the EU-SILC. Following the NTA methodology, these
profiles are estimated with the mean distribution by age in the EU-SILC separately for
employees (salaried workers) and self-employed.
Public Transfers
According to Eqs. [2] and [3], public transfers are divided into outflows (paid by individuals
to the public sector) and inflows (received by individuals from the public sector). Outflows
refer mainly to social contributions and taxes. Social contributions are estimated based on
the estimated labor income profiles. In the case of taxes, the profiles are estimated at the
maximum detailed category, using a mixture of consumption, income and asset profiles
depending upon the type of tax. For example, profiles of special taxes on alcohol and
tobacco are calculated using alcohol and tobacco consumption profile by age in the EPF
survey. Public inflows are first split into in-kind (health, education, other) and cash benefits
(pensions and other social transfers). In-kind profiles are assumed to be equal to the public
consumption ones, and therefore the equivalent profiles were used. Regarding cash 
transfers, they are composed mainly of retirement pensions, but also include all kinds of
social transfers. The information about their distribution by age is available in the EU-SILC,
but also in the statistics published by Spanish public administrations (MEYSS) which refer to
total population. Therefore, we construct the age profiles by education level using EU-SILC
data and then they are adjusted to the aggregate by age observed in MEYSS.
Private Transfers
Private transfers can take place inside the household – intra-household transfers – or
between different households – inter-household. In both cases, they are estimated at the
household level and, therefore, NTA methodology assumes that the household head is the
owner of assets. In the case of inter-household transfers, this implies that transfers are
undertaken between household heads. Inter-household transfer profiles are estimated using
the EU-SILC survey, where the amount of transfers given or received from other households
is specified. Regarding intra-household transfers, they should ideally be estimated using a
9
 
 
 
        
        
             
   
 
       
     
       
    
          
   
   
 
  
     
           
        
       
         
   
 
 
    
 
        
      
         
          
           
           
    
 
 
                                                        
            
 
11 Abío et al.: Intergenerational Transfers in Spain: The Role of Education 
survey containing information on both consumption and income. Unfortunately, this is not
the case of Spain and many European countries – as explained above, consumption data are
collected by EPF, while income is collected by EU-SILC. Hence, both data sets need to be
combined. 3 
To construct the private transfer profiles, the standard NTA method assumes that the
household head is the owner of all assets and, therefore, all asset flows (like housing
services) run from the household head to other members. Besides housing, transfers occur
because members with a surplus (more income than consumption) make transfers to
members with a deficit (more consumption than income). When the total sum of surpluses
and deficits becomes a surplus or a deficit, the household head is responsible for balancing it
using asset income or dissaving (in the case of deficit) or saving (in the case of surplus).
Asset-based reallocations
Profiles of asset-based reallocations are based on the previously described profiles of
housing, total net transfers and lifecycle deficit, plus three new profiles for property income,
capital income and interest payments. The three profiles are estimated from data in EU-SILC, 
based on the same assumption that assets are owned by the household head. Each of these
profiles is adjusted to the corresponding aggregate of asset-based reallocations, in order to
obtain final profiles of asset income and savings for the private and public spheres.
4. Analyzing intergenerational transfers by education level in Spain
In this Section we present the NTA age profiles disaggregated by education level of
household head obtained for Spain for 2006. Figure 4 shows per capita labor income and
consumption. Both present the expected pattern: while consumption is quite stable over the
lifecycle – a little lower for children and the elderly – labor income is concentrated in the
central period of working age. The average results – without differentiating by education
level – are consistent with those previously obtained for Spain referring to other years
(Patxot et al. 2011 for 2000; Patxot et al. 2015 for 2008). 
3 See UN (2013). For a subsequent update applied to European particularities see also Istenič et al/
(2016).
10
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12 
[Figure 4 about here]
The effect observed for education level is remarkable, especially in the case of labor income.
From age 25, individuals with secondary and post-secondary education earn clearly more
than those with only primary studies. These differences reach a maximum at ages 45-49,
when the per capita labor income profile peaks. At that point, per capita labor earnings for
those with post-secondary education reach €33,000 a year, representing 41% more than the
figure observed for individuals with secondary education, and more than double the one 
corresponding to individuals with only primary studies. As the profiles shown are in per
capita terms, they are influenced by the participation and employment rates, which differ
significantly according to the level of education. Indeed, aggregated data of unemployment
and participation rates by level of education show that participation in the labor market
increases with the educational attainment of individuals, while unemployment rates
decrease. Table 2 shows the labor status of the household heads collected in the EU-SILC
2006, by age and education level. As observed, after age 25 – when the education period can
be considered complete – both the participation and the employment rates are favorable for
those individuals with higher education. This advantage moreover increases with age. As an
example, from ages 55-64, only 3% of household heads with post-secondary studies are non­
participants, compared with 11% of those with only primary education. Furthermore, in the
same age category, 75% of participating household heads with post-secondary studies are
employed, compared with only 59% of those with just primary education.
[Table 2 about here]
It is also worth noting that, as Table 2 shows, individuals from households with post­
secondary education tend to remain more years in the labor market. First, looking at the age
group 54-64 (close to the legal retirement age), 76% of individuals with post-secondary
education participate in the labor market (75% are employed and 1% unemployed),
compared with only 65% of those with only primary studies. On the contrary, non­
participants and retired percentages are higher in the lowest education group. Second, 80%
of individuals aged 65 and more with primary studies are retired, 2% employed and 18% are
non-participants (probably meaning that they are not entitled to receive a retirement
pension). Conversely, individuals with higher education in the same age group who are non­
participants only represent 5%, while the employed percentage is significantly higher (7%).
11
 
 
 
          
        
         
      
        
   
 
           
     
   
  
 
        
   
          
            
          
         
          
         
       
  
 
     
   
         
             
        
              
       
       
       
   
         
13 Abío et al.: Intergenerational Transfers in Spain: The Role of Education 
This could have different explanations, such as that a good part of these highly educated
individuals are liberal professionals without a compulsory retirement age. Moreover, these
jobs tend to be less influenced by the physical capacity of workers. Overall, the interaction
between educational attainment and labor market characteristics leads to an expected, but
interesting result: the higher the level of education the higher the labor income profile from
age 25 on.
Compared to other countries, Spain presents a similar labor income age profile to the one
observed in other European countries such as Austria, Finland, Germany and Sweden, where
labor participation of the elderly is low (Lee and Ogawa, 2011). On the other hand, the USA 
and other American and Asian countries present large elderly shares of labor participation.
Differences by education level are also observed in the consumption profiles, although they
are less important. Again, the higher the education level the greater the consumption level, 
the life pattern being practically the same in any case: consumption grows during childhood
and tends to remain quite stable over the rest of the lifecycle. It is worth mentioning that
this trend is also observed in other countries, such as Austria, but differs from that observed
in a few high-income countries (Sweden, Finland, Germany and the USA), where
consumption grows sharply during late old age (Tung, 2011). The reason for the increase
observed in these countries is public consumption – in-kind public transfers –, which
increases dramatically after age 70-75, while private consumption tends to remain constant
or even decrease.
The difference between consumption and labor income gives the lifecycle deficit (LCD) for
each age group. The LCD can be considered as a measure of economic dependency.
Typically, it is positive during childhood and old age – consumption is higher than labor
income – but negative in the middle years of the working age – when labor income exceeds
consumption. The age range of negative LCD varies a little among countries, but in most
cases becomes negative around age 25-29 and lasts until 55-59. This is also what we
observed for Spain in 2006, but with some differences according to education level. While
childhood dependency finishes near age 25 in all cases, the surplus period is longer the
higher the education level. On the other hand, there are also differences in terms of the size
of both the deficit and especially the surplus. Indeed, in the case of less educated
individuals, deficits during childhood and old age are clearly higher than the small surplus 
12
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14 
they generate during the middle period of their lives. Higher educated individuals, although
they have bigger deficits, are able to generate much bigger surpluses due to their higher
labor income.
[Figure 5 about here]
After observing Figures 4 and 5, the conclusion is clear: the higher the education level the
higher the labor earnings and, as differences in consumption are smaller, the lower the LCD. 
The aggregate picture in the economy, plotted in panel b of Figure 5, depends on the
population structure by age and education level, shown in Figure 3.1. During childhood, the
highest aggregated LCD corresponds to individuals with secondary education (the most
numerous), while after age 60 the LCD is mainly generated by individuals with only primary
education. Conversely, during the working-age period individuals with secondary and post­
secondary education give rise to most of the surplus, while only a small part is generated by
individuals with only primary studies. Although the per capita profiles tend to be quite
constant over time, aggregated figures depend crucially on the age composition of the
population and on the population distribution by education level.
Below we disentangle the mechanisms used to finance LCD, according to Eq. [2]: transfers
(both public and private) and asset-based reallocations. The question is basically how the
young and the elderly receive resources to finance their consumption, as they are not able
to obtain labor income. Figure 6 shows the public transfers received (inflows), estimated
according to their age and education level. In the case of public transfers, only in-cash
benefits are obtained disaggregated by education level, while in-kind transfers (health,
education and other) are aggregated for all education levels. 
[Figure 6 about here]
As expected, public transfer inflows are concentrated in the two economic dependent life
periods. While children receive mainly in-kind transfers (education and some health
services), the elderly obtain both in-kind (health care) and especially cash transfers
(pensions). Unfortunately, as explained above, the EPC data do not allow disaggregation of
in-kind public transfers by education level. However, we could estimate private consumption
age profiles of both education and health care disaggregated by education level of
household head, shown in Figures 7 (education) and 8 (health care). As observed, public
13
 
 
 
           
     
    
        
         
     
 
   
 
           
         
          
    
    
 
   
 
      
          
       
    
         
   
    
          
  
 
         
    
    
    
                
        
          
               
15 Abío et al.: Intergenerational Transfers in Spain: The Role of Education 
education is clearly the most important, especially among ages 5-19. From that age, public
expenditure decreases sharply, and private expenditure becomes relatively more important.
Also, it is worth noting that private expenditure increases significantly with the education
level of the household. On average, it is observed that individuals in households with post­
secondary education spend nearly four times more on private education than those in
households with only primary studies (€4,894 compared with €1,289). 
[Figure 7 about here]
In the case of health (Figure 8), public expenditure is again clearly the highest at all ages.
Some differences in private per capita expenditure according to the education level of
household head are also observed, although they are lower than in the case of education.
Households tend to complement public health care with some private expenditure,
especially from age 45 onwards.
[Figure 8 about here]
In the case of cash transfers we observe that, from ages 35-55, the higher the education
level the lower the cash transfers received. This probably reflects the lower unemployment
rate of high-educated people, which implies that they receive less unemployment benefits.
However, after age 65 the opposite occurs, in this case showing that individuals with better
contribution careers (high-educated) obtain a higher retirement pension. If we look at the
65-69 age group, when most individuals enter retirement, per capita cash benefits are
almost 10% higher for individuals with secondary studies than for individuals with only
primary education. In the case of individuals with post-secondary education, the difference
with those with primary studies increases to 33%.  
If the education level of the household was a good indicator of its income level, the cash
transfer inflow profiles observed (Figure 6) would mean that public expenditure has a
limited impact on redistribution: the amount of cash benefits is a little lower for the most
educated during the working-age period, but clearly higher at retirement age. In-kind
transfers also play a role, which we are unable to evaluate properly due to the lack of data.
However, they are considerably lower than the cash benefits after age 50. Hence, the
redistributive impact of the public transfer system seems to be weak. Nevertheless, it is also
necessary to look at the outflows profile – taxes and contributions paid – shown in Figure 9 
14
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16 
to complete the picture about redistribution effects. Until age 25 very small differences are
observed, but during the rest of their life high-educated individuals pay much more taxes
and contributions to the public sector. The differences reach maximums in middle age.
Individuals aged 45-49 with post-secondary education pay on average almost €15,000 a year
in taxes and contributions, which is twice the amount paid by individuals of the same age
with only primary education, and 42% more than those with secondary studies. Hence, the
public transfer system seems to be redistributive, at least on the revenue side. 
[Figure 9 about here]
In order to complete the analysis about the redistribution effects of the public transfer
system in Spain, in Figure 10 we plot the aggregated net public transfer profile – inflows less
outflows – by education level according to the population distribution in 2006. We observe
that, during early childhood, most public transfers are received by households with
secondary or higher education, as they are the most numerous. On the contrary, during old
age most public transfers are directed toward the less educated. Although in general they
receive much lower benefits (Figure 6), there are much more recipients with only primary
studies at those ages. Moreover, we found that all education levels start to obtain negative
net public transfers – they pay more taxes than they receive – at the same age – around 25 – 
, while the lower the education level the sooner they start to obtain positive net public
transfers at old age (age 55 for primary studies, 60 for secondary and a little later for post­
secondary). Finally, during the working-age period taxes are mainly raised from individuals
with post-secondary and secondary education. It is important to note that this picture
corresponds exclusively to that observed in 2006. As mentioned above, although per capita
profiles tend to be quite stable, the aggregated profiles depend crucially on the population
distribution, which is changing rapidly both in age composition and education level.
[Figure 10 about here]
The second mechanism to finance LCD is private transfers, which can take place inside the
household – for example transfers from parents to children or between spouses – or
between different households – an example could be the elderly who give money to their
descendants living in another household, but also any other kind of private donation. 
[Figure 11 about here]
15
 
 
 
      
       
   
        
      
         
       
        
   
      
      
          
       
     
    
         
        
           
    
        
    
  
 
   
 
      
     
          
       
       
       
     
         
     
17 Abío et al.: Intergenerational Transfers in Spain: The Role of Education 
Figure 11 shows the age profile of net intra-household transfers obtained for Spain in 2006,
differentiating by education level. Children receive transfers from other family members
until age 25-30, but those in households with higher education receive considerably more.
That difference peaks at ages 15-25, coinciding with the higher education period, and
probably reflects the fact that children of high-educated families also tend to reach a high
education level, needing more transfers. At ages 25-65, individuals give more transfers to
the other household members than they receive, whatever their education level. However,
the size of those transfers is again clearly bigger for higher education levels – on average, an
individual with post-secondary education aged 45-49 gives €10,429 a year to the rest of their
household members, which is 43% and 130% higher than individuals with secondary and
primary education, respectively. However, maybe the most interesting feature is observed
during old age: while individuals with lower education practically do not receive or give
transfers to the rest of the household members, those with secondary and post-secondary
studies are net recipients of family transfers, although the size of those transfers is small.
Renteria et al (2016) reveal that this could be related to a gender issue: as most men of high­
education level receive retirement pensions while only a few women do, the latter need to
receive transfers from their spouses. Moreover, most of the elderly live alone or as a couple,
although a lower education level increases the probability of them living with younger
generations (Zueras and Ajenjo Cosp, 2010). This could be one of the reasons why the 
elderly of lower socioeconomic status are net donors of private transfers to other members
of the household, especially when taking into account that the older generations are
frequently the house-owners in extended families.
[Figure 12 about here]
In Figure 12 we display the age profiles of inter-household transfers, differentiating inflows
and outflows, by education level. The amount of inter-household transfers is much lower
than that observed for intra-household transfers. In the case of inflows, it is almost not even
worth mentioning differences by education level. However, they are more notable in the
case of outflows, being higher educated individuals who make more transfers to other
households. It should be noted that, by construction, the aggregate net inter-household
transfers equal the net transfers of the country with the rest of the world. Hence, in a
country with a relatively high proportion of foreigners (9.27% of the population in Spain in
2006), a negative transfer balance (remittances abroad exceed those received) is plausible.
16
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18 
Finally, asset-based reallocation is the third tool to finance LCD according to Eq. [2]. It is
especially relevant for the elderly – as they can save before they grow old – but not for
children – it would imply borrowing during childhood to repay the credit later. In order to
show this, Figure 13 displays the relative importance of the different sources to finance
consumption during childhood – ages 0-19 – and old age – age 65 and over – estimated by
education level. 4 As can be observed, for children private transfers play the main role,
followed by public transfers. On the contrary, labor income is very low at these ages, and
asset-based reallocation is slightly negative5 . In the case of the elderly, the differences by
education level are more striking. Public transfers are clearly the most important source of
financing for elderly consumption, although their importance decreases with education
level. Individuals with primary studies finance about 80% of their consumption with public
transfers, while this share goes down to 67% and 51% in the case of individuals with
secondary and post-secondary education, respectively. Regarding labor income, its
importance is more significant the higher the education level. While the elderly with primary
studies can barely finance 4% of their consumption needs with labor income, those with
secondary and post-secondary studies finance 10% and 16%, respectively. The role of private
transfers is also limited and, as seen above, individuals with only primary education are net
givers, while the rest are net recipients. Finally, asset-based reallocation also plays a 
remarkable role in financing old-age consumption, a little lower in the case of individuals 
with secondary education – who finance 12% of their consumption through asset-based
reallocations –, while this share is 19% for individuals with primary studies and 25% for those
with post-secondary studies.
[Figure 13 about here]
Overall, our results reveal that, besides age population composition, education level has a
large impact on the economic behavior of households and, hence, on the size of macro
magnitudes of the economy. By way of illustration, Table 3 summarizes the results of a 
simple simulation exercise, calculating the LCD with alternative scenarios of population
composition by education level. In particular, maintaining the profiles obtained by age and
4 Regarding the working age, labor income is the main source of financing as it is necessary to finance
not only consumption, but also transfers, both public (taxes) and private (mainly to other members of
the household).
5 A non-zero asset-based reallocation for children is obtained by construction in the NTA, as public
asset-based reallocation is imputed among the whole population.
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19 Abío et al.: Intergenerational Transfers in Spain: The Role of Education 
education level constant, we compute the aggregate LCD together with the consumption
and labor income in hypothetical scenarios where the entire population has the same
education level (primary, secondary or post-secondary). The results show that education
clearly matters. On the one hand, labor income with the whole population in post-secondary
level would be 129% of that observed with the actual distribution. On the other hand,
consumption would also be higher (123%), but to a lesser extent. Consequently, aggregate
LCD would go down to 76% of the value observed with the real population composition. 
Exactly the opposite occurs when we assume that the entire population has primary studies.
[Table 3 about here]
Figure 14 summarizes the implications of those changes in terms of financing the lifecycle
deficit. It compares the relative importance of the three mechanisms available to finance
LCD (TG, TF and ABR) in the three hypothetical scenarios of population distribution
compared to the one observed. The total absolute value of the lifecycle deficit is given in
each scenario, while the bars measure the size of each financing tool. Public and private
transfers (TG and TF, respectively) are computed combining the constant age profiles with
changing population structure, while ABR is the balancing item. Note that TG is zero in the 
real situation, by construction (see Section 3), but this is not true in our simulation exercise
where we assume the same level of education for the whole population. As is shown, the
huge LCD of an only primary educated society would need an important share of positive
public transfers. On the contrary, public transfers would become negative (more taxes paid
than transfers received) in the case of the whole population having post-secondary
education. Along the same lines, the importance of both private transfers and asset-based
reallocations would also clearly increase with the population’s education level.
[Figure 14 about here]
Finally, it is worth recalling that our analysis refers to 2006 in order to avoid the possible
effects of the economic crisis. Our results could certainly be affected by the crisis, although a
thorough analysis of this question is beyond the scope of this paper. However, by way of
illustration, we estimated the per capita LCD profiles by level of education for 2012, which
can be considered one of the worst years of the economic crisis according to macro­
economic indicators. Comparison of the LCD profiles by level of education in 2012 and 2006,
18
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20 
shown in Figure 15, are revealing: the economic crisis hit the less educated especially hard, 
their surplus period (over the working–age period) completely disappearing. Individuals with
secondary studies also worsen significantly in terms of surplus while, on the contrary, the
LCD of the most educated remains more or less the same.
[Figure 15 about here]
5. Further remarks
The role of intergenerational transfers has been investigated over many years in the
literature, although the lack of data has limited the extent of empirical evidence. In the early
2000s the National Transfer Accounts project was launched, aimed at constructing an
internationally comparable data set containing information about the reallocation of
resources between ages in each country. NTA provide valuable information, not previously
available, about how economic resources move across ages in a country in a given year.
Nowadays, about 40 countries are involved in that project, and NTA estimations for several
years are available for most of them.
Some extensions of NTA have been derived by introducing some kind of individual
heterogeneity, in order to enrich the information provided even more. For example, NTA can
be disaggregated by gender or by socioeconomic status of individuals or households. In this
paper, we estimated the NTA for Spain disaggregated according to education level of
household head – defined as the person earning the highest income in the household. The
reference year is 2006 in order to avoid any effects of the economic crisis. We aimed to
identify the differences in behavioral patterns over the lifecycle according to education
attainment. Our results are useful to assess the socioeconomic impact of the education
transition experienced over recent decades. Moreover, they provide valuable information to
evaluate the effects of welfare state policies, specifically education. 
The NTA profiles disaggregated by education level of household head obtained for Spain
show important differences through the lifecycle behavior patterns. First, the labor income
age profile presents the typical inverted-U shape, peaking at around ages 40-50, but is
19
 
 
 
            
   
      
   
        
      
           
     
 
 
             
         
        
        
            
        
        
         
     
    
           
 
  
        
        
        
            
      
         
       
            
           
   
 
21 Abío et al.: Intergenerational Transfers in Spain: The Role of Education 
considerably higher for the higher education levels (per capita earnings at age 50 for
individuals with post-secondary education are twice the earnings of those with only primary
studies). This is due not only to higher-paying jobs, but also to the higher participation and
employment rates for better educated individuals. Moreover, the profile shows a tendency
of those higher educated individuals to remain longer in the labor market. Second, regarding
the consumption profile, the pattern is again similar for the three education levels, with
differences in level, although smaller than in the case of labor – high-educated individuals
consume around 50% more than individuals with primary studies. As a result, per capita LCD
is more favorable as the education level improves.
Regarding the mechanisms to finance LCD, significant differences are also observed by level
of education. Public transfer profiles show that high-educated individuals pay considerably
higher taxes and contributions from age 25, although they also receive higher cash transfers
during old age (through the pension system). We could not disaggregate in-kind transfers by
level of education due to the lack of micro data, although the total age profile shows that
they are especially important during childhood (education expenditure) and clearly lower
than cash transfers during old age. This is a limitation of our analysis, because it prevents us
from knowing how public in-kind transfers might be differently distributed according the
socioeconomic status of the household. However, even without this disaggregation, we are 
able to observe that children from lower educated households rely more on public transfers, 
which are mostly in-kind. Therefore, we can expect that this result would be reinforced by
the eventual disaggregation of in-kind public transfers by level of education.
Private intra-household transfers show that individuals receive transfers from the rest of the
household members until age 25, the amount of these transfers being bigger for the higher
educated. Between ages 25-65, all individuals give net transfers to other family members
whatever their education level, although again the size of the transfers is clearly higher for
better educated individuals. Finally, during old age, lower educated individuals hardly
receive or give any transfers to other family members, while those with secondary and post­
secondary studies are net recipients of some transfers. The size of inter-household transfers
observed is small for any education level, especially in the case of inflows – received by
individuals. Finally, asset-based reallocations play a role in the LCD financing of the elderly,
being more important for individuals with post-secondary education.
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22 
Overall, our results reveal that, besides age population composition, education level has a
large impact on the economic behavior of households and, hence, on the aggregate
economy. Better educated households tend to participate more and longer in the labor
market, to produce more and, consequently, to consume more. They are capable of
contributing to the public system with higher taxes and contributions, and they depend less
on public transfers over their lifecycle. Therefore, particularly education seems to be crucial
to sustain the welfare state in an ageing society. A simple simulation exercise, applying the
profiles observed and assuming that the total population of 2006 has post-secondary
education, shows that the aggregate LCD would go down considerably, as aggregate labor
income would increase by 29% and consumption by 23%. This exercise shows the potential
for education as a policy to alleviate the impact of ageing on the sustainability of the welfare
state. Undoubtedly, this positive effect is subject to the fact that the labor market can
efficiently absorb those more educated individuals. The current high unemployment rate in
Spain as a result of the current crisis is not signaling a very positive prospect in this sense.
Nevertheless, this situation is expected to change once baby boomers start retiring from
2022 on. One could argue that the near prospect of ageing does not seem to recommend
increasing expenditure on education. Nevertheless, it is worth considering that such a policy
would also act as pre-funding for future retirement pensions. As long as they are financed on
a pay-as-you-go basis, more educated and hence productive individuals will be able to
contribute more to finance it. Consequently, the austerity measures applied during the crisis
could have found a better candidate than education expenditure.
There are also further policy implications regarding inequality. Our results show that higher
educated parents spend four times more resources on private education of their children
than those with only primary studies. This could partly explain why the level of education of
the parents influences to a large extent the one achieved by their children – as pointed out
by the OECD (OECD, 2015), on average individuals are 4.5 times more likely to attend higher
education if one of their parents has a higher education degree than if both of them have
only primary studies. This calls for the need for an effective public policy to compensate for
this gap and foster equal opportunities for all citizens.
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26 
Figures and Tables
Figure 1 Per capita public (TG) and private (TF) transfers received by children and the 
elderly in NTA countries (as percentage of the average labor income for ages 30-49 in the 
same country) 
Note: estimations refers to the following years: 1996 (Brazil), 1998 (Taiwan), 1999 (Philippines), 2000 (Austria,
 
Spain and South Korea), 2003 (Germany, Sweden and USA), 2004 (Costa Rica, India, Japan, Mexico, Slovenia and
 
Thailand), 2005 (Hungary and Indonesia).
 
Source. !uthors’ elaboration with NT! data (www.ntaccounts.org). 
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27 Abío et al.: Intergenerational Transfers in Spain: The Role of Education 
Figure 2 Distribution of Spanish households according to their total income level (in
deciles) and the level of education of the household head
Source. !uthors’ elaboration from EU-SILC referring to 2006
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28 
Figure 3 Population distribution by age and level of education of the household head in
Spain 2006 (EPF and EU-SILC)
Note: Dashed lines refer to EPF and continuous lines to EU-SILC
Source. !uthors’ calculations from EPF (2006) and EU-SILC (2007) 
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Figure 4 Per capita age profiles of consumption and labor income by level of education
(Spain 2006)
Source. !uthors’ elaboration
Figure 5 Age profiles of Lifecycle deficit (LCD) by level of education in Spain 2006
a) Per capita b) Aggregated
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30 
Figure 6 Per capita profiles of public transfer inflows by age and level of education
Source. !uthors’ elaboration
Figure 7 Per capita profiles of education expenditure (in € a year)
Source. !uthors’ elaboration
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31 Abío et al.: Intergenerational Transfers in Spain: The Role of Education 
Figure 8 Per capita profile of health expenditure (in € a year)
: 
Source: !uthors’ elaboration
Figure 9 Per capita profiles of public transfer outflows by age and level of education
Source. !uthors’ elaboration
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32 
Figure 10 Aggregated profiles of net public transfers by age and level of education
Source. !uthors’ elaboration
Figure 11 Per capita profiles of net intra-household transfers by age and level of education
Source. !uthors’ elaboration
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33 Abío et al.: Intergenerational Transfers in Spain: The Role of Education 
Figure 12 Per capita profiles of inter-household transfers (inflows and outflows) by age and
level of education
Note: Solid lines refer to inflows and dashed lines to outflows
Source. !uthors’ elaboration
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Figure 13 Consumption financing of children (0-19) and the elderly (65+) by level of 
education
Source. !uthors’ elaboration
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35 Abío et al.: Intergenerational Transfers in Spain: The Role of Education 
Figure 14 Lifecycle deficit financing with alternative population distributions by level of
education
Note: TG are public transfers, TF private transfers and ABR asset-based reallocations
Source. !uthors’ elaboration
Figure 15 Per capita LCD  profiles by level of education in 2006 and 2012 (in 2006 euros) 
a) 2006 b) 2012
Source. !uthors’ elaboration
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Table 1 Education categories in EPF and EU-SILC surveys, and final classification of
education groups
EPF EU-SILC Final classification 
Illiterate
Incomplete compulsory
Compulsory*
Primary Primary
Professional training stage 1
Second stage secondary education
First stage secondary
Second stage secondary
Secondary
Professional training stage 2
University
Professional training stage 2
University
Post-secondary
Table 2 Labor status of household heads by education and age group in Spain 2006 (in % of
total population)
AGE 
e du ca ti o n
l e ve l 
n on -
p a rti ci p a n t e mp l o ye d u n e mp . re ti re d 
15-24 
p ri ma ry 23% 67% 10% 0% 
s e co n d a ry 10% 83% 7% 0% 
p os t-s e co nd 19% 73% 8% 0% 
25-34 
p ri ma ry 4% 82% 15% 0% 
s e co n d a ry 2% 91% 7% 0% 
p os t-s e co nd 1% 95% 3% 0% 
35-44 
p ri ma ry 2% 87% 8% 3% 
s e co n d a ry 2% 94% 4% 1% 
p os t-s e co nd 1% 97% 3% 0% 
45-54 
p ri ma ry 6% 85% 5% 4% 
s e co n d a ry 3% 90% 4% 3% 
p os t-s e co nd 2% 96% 2% 1% 
55-64 
p ri ma ry 11% 59% 6% 24% 
s e co n d a ry 8% 61% 7% 24% 
p os t-s e co nd 3% 75% 1% 22% 
65+ 
p ri ma ry 18% 2% 0% 80% 
s e co n d a ry 13% 4% 1% 82% 
p os t-s e co nd 5% 7% 0% 88% 
-SILC 2006 
 
 
Table 3 NTA aggregates under alternative population distributions by level of education
(in percentage of real distribution)
YL C LCD 
al l -pri ma ry 72% 82% 154% 
al l -s e con d a ry 95% 98% 121% 
al l - p os t s e con da ry 129% 123% 76% 
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